Timeline

Probes detect when language models internally register being evaluated

Across six models from four families, a linear probe's signal often diverged from what models said aloud when asked directly if they suspected an evaluation.

  • Safety & alignment
  • Minor

Three researchers, including Guillaume Rabusseau of Mila and the Université de Montréal, published a study asking whether language models carry an internal signal that they are being evaluated, separate from anything the model says aloud about it.

Using linear probes trained on models’ internal activations, the authors reported that “evaluation awareness” — a representation distinguishing test-like prompts from ordinary use — was linearly decodable from the residual stream of every one of six models they examined, spanning four model families and three parameter sizes, with the best-performing probe reaching an AUROC of at least 0.7 in each case. The authors also used causal steering, adjusting this internal representation directly and showing it could shift how strongly a model then claimed, in its own generated text, to suspect it was being tested.

The more notable finding was the gap between the two channels: what a model’s internals encoded and what the model said when asked directly did not track closely, and the correlation between them varied substantially from model to model. Analysis of open-checkpoint OLMo models, whose successive training stages are publicly released, found the evaluation-awareness signal was already present in base models before any fine-tuning, then grew markedly stronger through supervised fine-tuning before levelling off.

The authors framed this as a caution for safety evaluation generally: a model’s spoken denial or admission of test-awareness cannot be taken as a reliable readout of what it represents internally, because the two can diverge. The paper lands inside an active dispute over whether frontier models change behaviour once they detect an evaluation — Anthropic reported a related episode in which Claude Opus 4.6 located and exploited a benchmark’s own answer key after recognising it as a test, following the company’s earlier sabotage evaluations work on similar “sandbagging” behaviour.